Prior empirical studies suggest repeated exchange develops increasing value in buyer-supplier relationships. A first order implication of this finding is that buyers will focus exchange to generate maximum value in relationships. However, buyers are equally concerned with value capture. By distributing rather than focusing exchange, buyers may position themselves to capture more of the value created, leaving buyers potentially conflicted concerning the choice. We label this dynamic the second paradox of embeddedness, distinguishing it from Uzzi's (1997) paradox driven by technological uncertainty. By examining the procurement activities of a large, diversified manufacturing company, we then test for supplier and buyer behavior consistent with the conditions that enable and behaviors that result from this second paradox.
INTRODUCTION
A broad scholarly literature argues that repeated exchange between firms improves the efficiency of exchange by mitigating ex post opportunism and fostering value-creating adaptation (e.g., Granovetter 1985 , Williamson 1996 , Dyer 1997 , MacLeod 2007 . Repeated exchange develops trust (Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone 1998, Jeffries and Reed 2000) , inter-organizational routines (Dyer and Singh 1998) , social connections between individuals in each firm (Levinthal and Fichman 1988, Uzzi 1999) , and heightened expectations of relationship continuity (Parkhe 1993) . Together, these factors comprise relational assets that expand the value created in exchange-dynamically increasing with evolving exchange histories (Kale, Perlmutter, and Singh 2000, Gulati and Stych 2008) . Over the past two decades, the value-creating potential of such "embedded" inter-organizational relationships has been well documented empirically (e.g., Gulati 1995 , Zollo, Reuer, and Singh 2002 , Dyer and Chu 2003 , Gulati and Nickerson 2008 , including recent direct evidence that economic value produced by relationships increases with exchange history within a dyad (Elfenbein and Zenger 2014) . A clear first-order implication of the build-up of relationship value through repeated exchange is for buyers to focus, developing increasingly deep relationships with a limited set of capable suppliers, in order to maximize value creation.
At the same time, scholars have highlighted a number of hazards associated with relationships.
First, while social connections developed through exchange can generate trust, this trust may provide an enhanced opportunity for malfeasance (Granovetter 1985: 491) , leading managers to potentially overestimate the benefits of embedded exchange. Additionally, if changing exchange conditions or production technology undermine current suppliers' advantages, concentrating exchange and developing only a handful of these deep, socially embedded exchange relations may leave buyers "stuck" in suboptimal long term relationships (Blau; 1964; Uzzi 1997; Afuah, 2000) . Interpersonal affinity that develops through repeated exchange may also shape (or distort) the selection of exchange partners. As Blau (1964) articulates rather simply: "Strong attachments prevent individuals from exploring alternative opportunities." The result is a "dark side" to relationships, creating an embeddedness paradox (Uzzi 1997) where buyers benefit from relationships in the present, but at the cost of neglecting to identify or to choose a set of suppliers better suited to future needs.
Yet, even in the absence of all of these traditionally cited "dark side" problems of deep (and potentially exclusive) relationships -ex post hold-up, myopia with respect to seeking dynamically changing options, and the distortionary influence of "friendships" -it is not clear that buyers should maximize the value creating potential of relationships by concentrating exchange in the hands of a few.
This stems from two fundamental tensions that have been largely, if not completely, ignored in the literature on relationships. First, a buyer's choice of supplier in the present can either increase the maximum relationship value available for future appropriation or increase the minimum it is assured of appropriating, but not both. Second, the choice of supplier reveals information to the supplier about the value the buyer assigns to relationships, making it easier for the supplier to claim a portion of the value that is "up for grabs" in the future. In the spirit of the prior literature, we denote these tensions as the "second paradox of embeddedness." The focus of this paper, then, is to articulate the impact of these tensions theoretically and highlight their boundary conditions. We also provide evidence consistent with their existence in an empirical context in which relationships create value, but the traditional "dark side" challenges have been mitigated by a routinized process of extensive search for and screening of potential new suppliers and by a transparent, de-socialized supplier selection process that minimizes distortions due to interpersonal affinity.
Our main theoretical argument builds on the value-based strategy literature (Brandenburger and Stuart 1996 , Lippman and Rumelt 2003 , MacDonald and Ryall 2004 ) that focuses on how the added value of individual firms constrains the division of value between firms engaged in competitive or cooperative interaction. By describing how the future added value of suppliers changes as a consequence of the buyer's current decision, we demonstrate the dilemma the buyer faces. In simple terms, the buyer's dilemma is between growing the minimum appropriable value by distributing exchange and growing the maximum appropriable value by focusing exchange. Focus creates deep relationships with a single (or few) seller(s), but leaves buyer and seller to bargain over this greater value. Distribution diminishes the uniqueness (i.e., added value) of any given supplier's relational history, thereby restricting the suppliers' ability to appropriate their relationships' value. We further describe how this dilemma is also shaped by how effective the buyer believes suppliers will be in claiming value that is "up for grabs."
Our empirical analysis examines the procurement efforts of a large manufacturing corporation that performs a significant portion of its parts sourcing via Internet-based reverse (procurement) auctions. 1 As the preceding discussion indicates, a conceptual challenge for interpreting any empirical results is the fact that multiple theories predict the same behavior. In particular, both avoiding over-embeddedness and maximizing relationship value capture over time require a similar buyer response-distributing exchange across suppliers rather than concentrating it. Because our empirical setting, as we describe in greater detail below, is one in which the buyer's selection of suppliers is unlikely to be shaped by the challenges inherent in the first paradox of embeddedness, we are able to make the case that the behavior we observe represents an examination of our theory rather than prior ones. This setting also provides fine-grained detail about final supplier prices of bids both accepted and rejected as well as extensive detail about exchange history -data which has typically been unavailable to researchers. This allows us to examine both the total value the buyer associates with exchange history and suppliers' attempts to appropriate it.
In this empirical setting, the buyer we examine typically awards three-year supply contracts to one of several bidders who compete for the contract. A key feature of the firm's procurement process is that it actively seeks out qualified new suppliers, using a dedicated team of supply chain professionals, who additionally screen and pre-qualify all suppliers (auction participants) to ensure a capacity to manufacture and reliably deliver. Bidding for supply contracts is strictly limited to those suppliers prequalified for a specific set of items. All supplier bids, supplier and product characteristics, and the buyer's choices are observable.
While the parts procured through these auctions are predictably more standardized than those manufactured internally, important exchange hazards remain. Although all suppliers are deemed capable of high quality production and reliable delivery, performance at this level of capability is a choice for suppliers. In addition, some exchange specific investments may be required that, if made, enable hold-up or, if ignored, compromise quality or reliable delivery. Accordingly, there is scope in this setting for relationships to generate value. Within this empirical context, specifically, previous research demonstrates that a history of prior exchange with a supplier raises the buyer's willingness-to-pay (see Elfenbein and Zenger, 2014) -consistent with the buyer assigning value to accumulating relationship history or what others have termed "relational capital" (Kale, Perlmutter, and Singh 2000) .
Although the buyer in these auctions may choose any of the suppliers that bid, the choice commits the buyer to paying the bid price. Thus, bid prices represent suppliers' proposed division of value, including the value associated with relational capital, against the backdrop of competition with other technologically capable suppliers. Our ability to examine the array of prices offered from these suppliers, each with a unique relationship history, provides a window into the dynamics of buyer and supplier efforts to create and capture value in relationships.
We use this unique empirical setting to test for evidence consistent with hypotheses derived from our theoretical articulation of the second paradox of embeddedness. Our results support our hypotheses.
We view our theory and results as contributing to the literature on buyer-supplier relationships by offering an alternative mechanism that -under certain conditions -causes firms to forgo the benefits of deep relationships in favor of a broader portfolio of shallower ones. We do not claim primacy of this mechanism over others, but we do provide evidence consistent with its existence in an economically important setting. Additionally, we contribute to a small, but growing set of empirical studies on value appropriation in inter-firm relationships (e.g., Lavie 2007 , Chatain 2011 , Adegbesan and Higgins 2011 , Grennan 2012 , as well as to the theoretical investigations of how value creation and value appropriation concerns interact to generate performance differences across firms over time (e.g., Ryall and Sorenson 2007 , Chatain and Zemsky 2007 , Chatain and Zemsky 2011 , Obloj and Zemsky 2014 .
THEORY AND PREDICTIONS

Repeated exchange, relational capital, and buyer willingness-to-pay
A central tenet of modern economic theory is that writing and enforcing contracts that completely specify each party's obligations in all states of the world is rarely possible (Williamson 1975) . Many of the activities that generate (or destroy) value within an exchange are simply non-contractible (Hart 1994) and must instead be promoted (or prevented) through other means, such as bringing the transactions inside the firm (Williamson 1985) .
Sustained relationships are the frequently cited alternative to integration. Repeated exchange relationships can promote value-generation along these non-contractible dimensions by limiting ex post opportunism, promoting investments in and maintenance of exchange-specific assets (Klein 1996) , and by promoting efficient adjustments to shocks in market conditions (Williamson 1996, Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 2002) . By diminishing concerns about supply disruptions, they may also reduce the need for costly inventory holding. Similarly, by facilitating efficient exchange refinements in response to unexpected demand or design shocks, firms minimize costly and protracted renegotiations. Scholars have referred to the idiosyncratic value that emerges through these interactions as "relational rents" (Dyer and Singh 1998, Lavie 2006) . Distinct perspectives have emerged about how relationships generate these rents. One perspective argues that historic exchange relationships promote norms and social connections (Macneil 1978 , Bradach and Eccles 1982 , Dore 1982 Granovetter 1985) that support valuable inter-organizational trust (Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone 1998 , Dyer and Chu 2003 , Gulati and Nickerson 2008 , Puranam and Vanneste 2009 . A second perspective argues that a history of exchange elevates expectations about the likelihood of future exchange (Parkhe 1993, Poppo, Zhou, and Ryu 2008) , which shapes incentives to cooperate in the present (MacLeod 2007) or promotes the establishment of "more efficient cooperative routines" (Chassang 2010: 448; Gibbons and Henderson 2012) . Although emphasizing varied mechanisms, a broad range of literature suggests that repeated exchange generates increasing value within exchange dyads. We refer to the intangible, value-generating, relational asset that results from repeated exchange as relational capital.
A significant body of empirical analysis also suggests that value accumulates with increased relationship history. A meta-analysis of 39 studies documents a positive and significant association between relationship duration and trust (Vanneste, Puranam and Kletschmer 2013) . Other work suggests that costs fall as a consequence of repeated dyadic interaction between contractors and subcontractors (Gil and Marion 2013) . More directly, our own prior study in this empirical setting reveals a buyer whose willingness to pay for a relationship is strongly shaped by the level and duration of repeated exchange; these relationships are more highly valued by the buyer when exchanges are subject to greater exchange hazards, specifically when co-specialized investments are required (Elfenbein and Zenger, 2014) .
Considered in isolation, this evidence that value in relationships accumulates through repeated exchange should cause a buyer's supply network to become more concentrated over time, especially for transactions subject to exchange hazards. A supplier with greater relational capital is simply more attractive to a buyer and more likely to be chosen, ceteris paribus, leading the buyer to focus rather than distribute exchange. However, as we develop and test below, the desire to optimize the value created and captured leads to more complex predictions about buyer behavior. In particular, we argue that the buyer faces a dilemma in choosing between further increasing value in the most valuable exchange relationships and instead developing a more diverse set of relationships that ensure a greater minimum level of value appropriation. We label this phenomenon the "second paradox of embeddedness," articulate the conditions under which it can emerge, and provide evidence of behavior consistent with its influence and presence.
Sequential selection of suppliers and appropriation of relationship value
When valuable relational capital accumulates as a function of repeated exchange, a buyer's choice of supplier in the present not only affects the current stream of relational rents it receives, but also the future relational rents available to divide between buyer and suppliers and the likely future division of those relational rents. We argue that this dynamic makes the buyer's choice between an incumbent supplier with which it has an existing exchange history and a new supplier with which it has no history rather complex. In this section we develop an extremely simple model to illustrate the paradoxical nature of the buyer's choice. Our goal is not to develop a comprehensive model describing precisely when buyers will choose incumbents over new suppliers, but rather to simply illuminate how value creation and value appropriation dynamics affect this choice. Thus, we describe a setting in which the problems that underlie the first paradox of embeddedness are not present. The model reveals the dynamic interrelationships among buyer and supplier choices and enables us to isolate the necessary conditions for buyers to prefer distributing rather than concentrating exchange, and provides guidance for our analysis.
We consider a two-period setting in which a buyer chooses an exclusive supplier in each period for an input it cannot produce itself. For simplicity, we focus on the case in which the choice has been narrowed to two firms, both of which have been pre-screened and possess identical production capabilities. Both suppliers, thus, can be expected to deliver an input with the same gross contractible value, v, if chosen. Additionally, we assume that it is prohibitively costly to write a contract that covers both periods, perhaps because the specifications for parts needed in period 2 are unknown at the beginning of the period 1. We also ignore discounting across the periods, as it does not materially affect the analysis, though our assumption of two periods is a stylized representation of more complex intertemporal phenomenon.
Following the discussion above, we define relational capital as an asset that accumulates as a function of repeated exchange between two parties that generates, in expectation, value in the form of improved exchange outcomes that are non-contractible. We denote the prior exchange history between buyer and supplier as h and represent the non-contractible value stemming from relational capital with the function V(h), with assumptions V(0) = 0 and > 0. Since we are interested in the conditions that lead a buyer to distribute rather than concentrate supply relationships, we focus on the case in which one potential supplier has a history of prior exchange, h > 0, with the buyer and the second potential supplier has no prior history with the buyer, but note that our analysis is robust to a variety of alternative, more general, assumptions. We refer to the supplier with h > 0 as the 'incumbent,' and the supplier with h = 0 as the 'new supplier.' In period 1, then, choosing the incumbent supplier generates gross value v + V(h), whereas choosing the new supplier only generates gross value v.
Because relational capital accumulates as a function of exchange, the buyer's choice of supplier in period 1 affects the relational capital held with that supplier in future periods. We designate the increase in exchange history that is generated during period 1 production as . For simplicity in the discussion that follows, we assume that h > ; however, our main results do not depend on this assumption. If the incumbent supplier is chosen in both periods, then the gross contractible and noncontractible value delivered to the buyer will be 2v + V(h) + V(h+), whereas choosing the incumbent supplier in one period and the new supplier in another yields 2v + V(h) and choosing the new supplier in both periods yields 2v + V(). It is clear (and intuitively obvious), then, that choosing the incumbent supplier in both periods maximizes the total value created. Simply put, there is more relational capital present among transacting parties in both periods when choosing the incumbent, resulting in greater noncontractible value. From the buyer's perspective and ignoring issues of value capture, the greater noncontractible value available for appropriation from choosing the incumbent makes this choice more attractive, ceteris paribus.
Although choosing the incumbent supplier ensures a greater availability of relational capital, it does not ensure that the buyer appropriates more value. To simultaneously address both value creation and value appropriation, we build on the value-based business strategy approach of Brandenburger and Stuart (1996) and MacDonald and Ryall (2004) , and in particular the theory of bi-form games (Brandenburger and Stuart 2007) . A key proposition of this approach is that no player may appropriate more than its added value.
3 Thus, each player's contribution to the total value jointly created functions as a constraint on the division of value, though it does not determine it completely. 4 We adopt Brandenberger and Stuart's (1996) terminology and define the added value of the incumbent (respectively, new supplier) in each period as the difference between the maximum value that can be created when buyer, incumbent, and new supplier are all available as potential transaction partners and the value that can be created when the incumbent (respectively, new supplier) is removed as a potential supplier. Because both suppliers are expected to produce contractible value, v, suppliers' added value is generated solely by differences in relational capital. We label this relational capital added value (RCAV). In the first period, then, the RCAV of the incumbent is V(h), and the RCAV of the new supplier is 0. Thus, the new supplier is unable to appropriate any value in period 1, while the incumbent may
The RCAV of each player in period 2, however, depends on the buyer's choice of supplier in period 1. Ultimately, how the buyer resolves this paradox between choosing the incumbent and choosing the new supplier depends on the proportion of relational capital added value it expects each supplier to capture in future periods. As we described above, the levels of relational capital (and their difference)
define the minimum and maximum amount of value that the buyer can capture. To illustrate how the buyer's expectations are critical, we introduce the parameter , as the proportion of a supplier's RCAV that the buyer expects the supplier to capture. By definition, all remaining value is captured by the buyer.
Given , then, we can compare which choice of supplier in the first period leads to greater buyer profits in the second period. In particular, choosing the new supplier in period 1 generates higher profits for the buyer in period 2 if:
Or re-arranging,
In (2), V(h+) -V(h) represents the growth in the future value the incumbent can provide if it is chosen in period 1, while V() is growth in the future value the new supplier can provide if it is chosen in period 1. Intuitively, the expression on the right hand side of (2) represents the ratio defined by the incremental relational capital value generated by choosing the incumbent and the sum of the individual increases in relational capital value were both the incumbent and new supplier separately awarded the entire contract.
6 5 Note that, our fundamental assumption that relational capital accumulates with repeated exchange is crucial here. If relational rents were simply present (the supplier is trustworthy) or absent (the supplier is unknown), based upon prior experience, then this choice would simply reduce to forgoing relational rents in a single period to create an equivalent second source. 6 We note that if V(h) displays diminishing marginal returns, the threshold value of  will be lower than if V(h) displays constant returns to scale.
The buyer's choice of supplier in period 1 is likely to be a function both of value it captures in period 1 and its expectation for period 2. Thus, in choosing the new supplier rather than the incumbent, the buyer incorporates the forgone relational capital value in the choice, which we can express as V(h) net of the price premium paid. If the negotiation process in period 1 leads to a price difference between the incumbent and the new supplier of p I -p N , 7 then the expected total two-period profits from choosing the new supplier in period 1 are greater if:
Re-arranging terms yields the critical value of  above which, the buyer prefers to choose the new supplier in period 1:
Inequality (4) indicates that the buyer's optimal choice of supplier in period 1 depends on both the price premium sought by the incumbent in period 1, relative to the new supplier's price, (p I -p N ) and the buyer's conjecture about the proportion of added value the incumbent will successfully capture in the period 2 (. As described above, we assume that the length of the supply contracts have been chosen optimally based upon considerations outside our model. Since neither supplier is able to commit to a price in the second period -nor is the buyer able to commit to choosing a particular supplier in the second period -the buyer's decision and the existence of our 2 nd paradox of embeddedness then turns on buyers' conjectures about .
Supplier value appropriation, the 2 nd paradox of embeddedness, and the buyer's response
While our model is stylized along a number of dimensions, it highlights the tension that the buyer faces in managing value creation and value capture in relationships, and demonstrates that the buyers' beliefs about the share of future RCAV suppliers will capture () critically impacts its decision to concentrate relational capital in the hands of a few suppliers (akin to choosing the incumbent in the discussion above). Moreover it shows that a paradox exists only if the true proportion of RCAV captured by suppliers is sufficiently high.
We argue that the buyer generates predictions about  based on the supplier behavior that it observes. 8 This has several empirical implications. First, if the buyer observes that incumbent suppliers do not seek to appropriate value from relational capital, then we should observe choices that concentrate relational capital in the hands of existing suppliers (i.e., the incumbents in the discussion above) and raise the asymmetry of relational capital. Under these conditions, the accumulation of relational capital through repeated exchange generates no paradox. 9 On the other hand, if incumbent suppliers do seek to appropriate significant value from relational capital by requesting higher final prices, then the buyer faces the 2 nd paradox. Relatedly, if -consistent with the predictions regarding relational capital added value in our stylized model -incumbent suppliers seek to appropriate a greater share of total value when no other rival suppliers possess relational capital and seek to appropriate less when rival suppliers possess greater levels of relational capital, then reducing asymmetries between suppliers leads to greater minimum value capture. If supplier behavior is consistent with these patterns of value appropriation, we should observe the buyer distributing relational capital more evenly across suppliers.
Second, if the buyer observes that the proportion of relational capital value sought by incumbents increases as they win more contracts, then the paradox more likely exists and we are correspondingly more likely to observe buyer choices that distribute relational capital more evenly across suppliers. This sort of 'value capture creep' could be generated if suppliers are initially uncertain about their relational capital added value -either because there is asymmetric information about its value to the buyer (i.e., the buyer knows it but the suppliers do not) or because the supplier lacks accurate knowledge of its rivals' exchange history -and follow a Bayesian updating process, revising upward estimates of their RCAV and their capacity to appropriate it after contract wins, and reducing them after contract losses. Clearly, if  -the buyer's expectations of RCAV captured by the leading supplier -is increasing with the supplier's contract wins, condition (4) is more likely to hold.
In summary, it is under these conditions, discussed above, that we expect the second paradox of embeddedness to be manifest, and expect buyers to respond by distributing exchange rather than solely exchanging with incumbents. To guide our empirical analysis, we make predictions about the type of supplier behavior that is likely to lead to the paradox, and then conditional on observing the predicted supplier behavior, we hypothesize how the buyer should respond. In particular, consistent with suppliers' effort to capture a portion of their RCAV, we predict: 
Buyer efforts to shape seller appropriation efforts
The buyer may not simply react to suppliers' value appropriation behavior. The buyer may additionally instead seek to shape it. Inequality (4) compares the expected total (two-period) profits from choosing the new supplier in the first period with the expected profits from choosing the incumbent supplier in the first period. We note that both sides of this inequality are decreasing in , indicating that reductions in the proportion of RCAV appropriated by suppliers are valuable to the buyer independent of its choice in the first period.
One mechanism through which the buyer may shape sellers' value appropriation attempts is to restrict sellers' capacity to learn about the function, V, causing them to either underestimate or be more uncertain about the value the buyer assigns. In response to increased uncertainty about this value, a risk averse supplier may correspondingly decrease price to increase its perceived odds of winning a contract.
Moreover, a buyer may wish to shape sellers' expectations about the division of RCAV that it is willing to accept. As in a repeated ultimatum game, the buyer may seek to develop a reputation for only accepting low prices (Roth 1995, Nowak, Page, and Sigmund 2000) . The buyer may also resort to deceptive tactics to influence sellers' assessments of its willingness-to-accept (Boles, Croson, and Murnighan 2000) , or may engage in "signal jamming" by adding noise to the selection process to make the bidders inference problem more difficult (Fudenberg and Tirole 1986; Stein 1989 ). In our setting, the buyer may find it strategically advantageous to keep the seller guessing as to the value assigned or simply lower the seller's estimate of the value assigned.
Viewed from an alternative perspective, making consistent choices based upon (4) would enable incumbent suppliers ultimately to discover  and to submit prices just under levels that would cause the buyer to switch. To prevent this, the buyer may from time to time place very low weight on relational capital in choosing a supplier, making it more difficult for a particular supplier or suppliers as a whole from accurately inferring the value it assigns to relational capital and the share it is willing to accept. This is an additional manifestation of the paradox, insofar as it offers a mechanism through which choosing an "inferior" supplier may make it better off in the future. This logic suggests the following hypothesis regarding buyer behavior:
H4: To prevent sellers from accurately inferring its willingness-to-pay for a history of exchange, the buyer will vary the value it appears to assign to this history over time.
EMPIRICAL SETTING
We test our theoretical predictions using rather unique data assembled from the procurement operations of a large, global diversified manufacturing company with headquarters in the Mid-Western Internet-enabled procurement auctions was a key strategic initiative at Buyco aimed at reducing overall manufacturing costs. These procurement auctions enabled greater direct competition between suppliers and also elevated the transparency of purchasing decisions, thereby reducing potential distortions to prices shaped by the presence of personal relationships. We highlight the most significant aspects of this procurement process in the ensuing discussion; we discuss the setting in greater detail in Elfenbein and Zenger (2014) A procurement auction, or competitive bid event (CBE), as Buyco labeled it, began with the identification of a bundle of items which Buyco believed could be efficiently provided by a single supplier. A given CBE could include a single bundle of products or could include several bundles. Buyco typically restricted the bundles in a CBE to a single narrowly-defined commodity category -e.g., plastic parts, stamped parts, or fasteners -taking advantage of the commodity-specific knowledge of its procurement staff.
After identifying a common bundle or set of bundles, Buyco scheduled a competitive bid event.
Buyco used the event to solicit bids from invited suppliers for long-term contracts to deliver the parts (the median contract length was three years). Invited suppliers' bids became final at the end of the event;
further negotiations following the conclusion of bidding was prohibited. Buyco, however, was not restricted to picking the supplier who provided the lowest bid. 10 For each auction, we observe a menu of bidders and prices from which Buyco selects a single bidder.
Critically, Buyco limited participation in the CBE to bidders that had been pre-qualified. A dedicated team of supply chain specialists travelled globally to identify and inspect potential bidders.
These procurement professionals assessed suppliers' capability and ensured that only those with the capability to produce and deliver the expected quality and quantity received invitations to participate.
Bidders frequently were qualified to bid on some, but not all, of the contracts in the CBE. Thus, prior to the initiation of a bid event, two drivers of the standard embeddedness paradox (Uzzi, 1997 ) -uncertainty about requisite capability of suppliers and development of a set of capable alternatives -had been addressed.
While the extensive pre-qualification process excludes bidders who do not possess the manufacturing capabilities to produce inputs of sufficient quality, the process does not resolve uncertainty about the potential for supplier opportunism over the duration of the supply contract. Given this extensive pre-qualification, and careful corporate scrutiny of all selections not consistent with lowest price, differences in bid prices across suppliers likely reflect bidders' beliefs about value in relationships and the bidder's efforts to capture this value, rather than differences in production quality above and beyond the stipulated standard that have no economic benefit to Buyco, as well as (unobservable) differences in their opportunity costs.
DATA
The sample
To construct the data, we selected CBEs performed during an 18 month period covering April 2005 to September 2006. This period corresponded to the beginning of a transition to a new application service provider that supplied technology and other support for the auctions. We limited our attention to economically important CBEs (more than $40,000 in expected annual spending) for items used directly in the manufacturing process. All auctions for indirect, i.e., overhead expenses, were omitted. This yielded an initial set of 242 CBEs representing procurement activity for 928 item bundles. We discarded all observations in which the winning bid was more than double that of the lowest bid. In these situations, we believed that the bids had been miscoded. 11 Missing data on the identity of the contract winner or missing information about suppliers led to further attrition in this sample. Additionally, we dropped from our data all reverse auctions in which only one official bid was submitted, as these do not help us identify any relationships of interest. Our final data set consists of 183 CBEs, for 557 items, with 3,032 bids from 860 bidders. In discussing the variables below, we index CBEs by m, item bundles by i, and bidders by j.
12
Relationship history. Our theoretical discussion focuses on the role that repeated exchange plays in creating valuable relational capital, and the appropriation dynamics that ensue between buyers and sellers over this jointly owned asset. We measure h jm , repeated exchange between Buyco and supplier j at the time of the CBE m, using data collected from a central accounting database used by Buyco that contains monthly data on the dollar value of all transactions with parts suppliers from 2002 to mid-year 2006. 13 In all, this accounting database contained more than one million transactions with more than twenty thousand distinct suppliers. We used text matching algorithms and visual inspection to correct for different spellings of suppliers in this database, an unfortunately common occurrence. We aggregated the part-level data to create a cumulative measure of each distinct supplier's quarterly dollar sales to Buyco.
11 Our results are robust to including all bids, and to tighter cut-off points for exclusion. 12 Because multiple bundles may be procured during a single CBE, i is nested within m. In the discussion below, we use m only when necessary to indicate that the relevant variation occurs across CBEs rather than across bundles. 13 Prior to 2002, this database is incomplete. Thus, we cannot trace all relationships back to their origin.
We use this data to create the variable, log sales jm , which is the natural log of sales from the supplier to Buyco in the prior four quarters plus a constant. The results that we report in the main body of the paper use this measure of relationship history. In Table A1 in the Appendix, we report the main results using an alternative measure based on relationship length, the log of the number of consecutive quarters with positive sales between the supplier and Buyco + 1. Our results are largely invariant to the measure of relationship history employed.
Dependent variables.
To examine bidder's tactics (H1 -H2), our main dependent variable is p ij , the final bid offer by bidder j for item i. These data are drawn directly from the auctioneer's records. This value reflects the product of unit price offered by the bidder and the number of units that Buyco anticipates purchasing. We use the log of this measure and denote this variable logbid ij and corroborate our results using the variable premium ij , which we calculate as the percent difference between j's bid and the lowest bid for item i.
To test H3, we construct two measures of exchange history asymmetry. The first measure examines the difference between the two highest levels of h j among bidders for item i. We designate the bidder with the highest level of h j as h 1 and the bidder with the second highest level as h 2 . We generate a normalized measure of the difference between these two exchange histories at the time of the CBE as and label this variable, exchange history gap. When the top two bidders have identical exchange histories, the value of this measure is 0; when only bidder 1 possesses an exchange history, the measure takes on the value zero. Additionally, we generate an entropy measure that captures the distribution of relational capital among all bidders for item i, following Jacquemin and Berry (1979). Let s ij represent the share of relational capital possessed by bidder j in the auction for item i, i.e.,
The relative concentration of relational capital among bidders in auction i, then is
When all relational capital is concentrated in the hand of a single supplier, E i = 0; this measure increases both in the number of suppliers with exchange histories and with the relative similarity in exchange histories among suppliers with non-zero exchange histories. We construct these measures at the time of the CBE, and prospectively at a time one year after the exchange, by re-calculating the winning bidder's exchange history to incorporate the value of the award.
Finally, to investigate H4, we construct a dependent variable y ij for each bidder-bundle pair, that takes on the value 1 if bidder j is awarded the contract for i and 0 if j places a bid for item i but does not win (H4). We examine whether the bidder's willingness-to-pay for relational capital varies over time using conditional logit estimates of a discrete choice model to examine how changes in p ij and log sales jm impact the likelihood that y ij = 1, holding other attributes of the auction fixed. The method we use to infer the willingness-to-pay associated by Buyco with this measure of h j is described in greater detail in Elfenbein and Zenger (2014) .
Prior awards. To test H2, we additionally construct priorwin jk as ratio of the number of contracts won by j in its k th CBE in the sample to the total number of items bid upon by j in its k th CBE. We construct this variable only for bidders who appear in three or more CBE's in our sample.
Exchange characteristics. Prior work suggests that the value of relational capital may be moderated by characteristics of an exchange. In particular, exchange hazards such as need for investment or maintenance of relationship-specific investments, product complexity, demand unpredictability, technological change, and number of alternative suppliers, may be systematically related to the improvement in exchange efficiency generated by relationships (Williamson 1996, Gulati and Nickerson 2008) . If the average suppliers' exchange history systematically varies with the characteristics of the exchange, an omitted variable bias may result in estimating the relationship between price, relationship value and exchange history. We thus collect information on these potential governance hazards using the evaluations of two procurement experts. For each CBE, the expert raters were supplied with detailed descriptions and drawings of the bundle of products within the CBE. Each expert then scored the products in each CBE along several dimensions using a 7-point Likert scale, comparing them to the universe of products sourced via reverse auctions. 14 Using these survey data, we obtained measures of complexity m of the parts procured, asset specificity m of production equipment, demand predictability m over time, technological change m in the prior 5 years, and number of worldwide suppliers m , a measure of the thickness of the market. Table 2 summarizes the data we analyze. In this dataset, the mean bid in the sample is $138,700, and the mean winning bid is $103,770. Bids range from roughly $1000 to $8 million. The median item received 5 bids, and Buyco selected the lowest-priced bidder 43.2% of the time. The median "premium,"
Summary statistics
i.e. the difference between the bid submitted by the lowest-priced bidder and the winning bidder, paid by BUYCO was 0.5% (average 6.7%). The median winning bidder offered the second lowest price.
Although only 58.9% of bids were submitted by bidders with some prior relationship with Buyco, 71.4%
of awards went to bidders with a prior relationship. Thirty eight percent of the bidders had yearly average transactions in excess of $100,000 and 17% had yearly average transactions in excess of $1 million. The Table 3 provides correlations between the bidder-level variables used in the analysis.
ANALYSIS
The analysis proceeds in three parts. We first investigate bidder behavior, testing H1a, H1b, and H2. To do this, we explore whether bidders bid less aggressively (i.e., submit higher prices) when they possess higher levels of relational capital, and higher levels relative to other bidders. Following our investigation of seller behavior, we examine how the buyer's decisions either concentrate exchange in the hands of a few suppliers, increasing the relational rents created by these relationships, or distribute it more evenly across suppliers, improving conditions for value appropriation (H3). We conclude this section by examining the buyer's promotion of uncertainty (signal jamming), by alternating periods in which choices are governed by relational considerations with periods in which relational considerations are largely ignored (H4).
Do bidders seek to appropriate relational capital added value? (H1a/b)
We examine attempts by bidders to appropriate the value of relational capital jointly possessed 
In equation ( We report robust standard errors, clustered on CBE (m) to allow for non-independence of bids across the CBE. Hypotheses H1a and H1b predict , and , respectively.
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16 This approach identifies   , based on differences in exchange histories between bidders. As stated above, the fixed-effect,  i , incorporates differences in competition for the contract for the bundle of parts in i. Thus, we are unable to distinguish between situations in which two players with similarly high levels of relational capital compete aggressively, pricing in such a way that Buyco receives the lion's share of V, from one in which these suppliers collude, resulting in the winning bidder capturing a large share of V. Given, however, that the median number of bidders for an item is 5, we suspect that competition for the bid contract is likely to be intense, i.e., that potential rents from similar levels of relational capital are likely to be competed away. Table 4 supports H1a and H1b.
Do suppliers bids reflect 'value capture creep'? (H2)
Next, we examine H2, which predicts that bidders with h jm > 0 will increase (decrease) their bids following wins (losses), as they infer the value Buyco associates with their relational capital and their added value. We denote k as the k th time, ordered chronologically, that we observe j bidding in our dataset. Using bidder fixed effects, we examine whether the premium over the lowest bid for item i in j's k th CBE relates to the fraction of items bid upon and won by j in its prior k-1 th CBE. In other words, we explore whether the bidder raises or lowers its bid relative to others differently following bid events in which it wins versus following bid events in which it loses. To do this, we must narrow the sample to those whose bids we observe three or more times. We must also drop the first observation for each bidder,
as it provides the lagged independent variable. The use of bidder fixed effects further eliminates any identification from bidders who appear only once in the sample. Thus we estimate:
The variable premium ijkm represents j's bid for item i divided by the lowest bid for item i;  j is a bidder fixed effect, which accounts for the average aggressiveness of the bidder across all auctions; priorwin j,k-1 is the fraction of items that j bids upon in its k-1 th appearance in the sample; and chars im is a vector of auction-level characteristics for item i, such as the log of the lowest bid, the number of bidders and the square of the number of bidders, the date of the bid event and k, to account for a time trends and an experience levels, respectively. 17 The mean time between bids for suppliers in this subsample is 89.4 days (standard deviation 90.1 days).
We report the results of this estimation in Table 5 . Across time, the overall trend in the data is for bidders to become more competitive, i.e., to lower their bids and bring them closer to the lowest bid.
Individual bidders, however submit significantly higher bids following winning episodes. Across the sample, these differences are economically significant-winning 25% more bids in the k-1 th auction leads a bidder to raise his bid on items in his k th auction by 2%-and they are statistically significant at the p < .01 level as well (see column 1). In column 2, we divide the sample into those with a relationship with Buyco in the quarter prior to the submission of the bid by interacting priorwin i,k-1 with a dummy variable indicating the existence of prior history of repeated exchange. Bidders with a prior exchange history raise their bids significantly following wins, whereas those with none do not adjust their bids following wins.
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These results support H2, and are consistent with the phenomenon of 'value capture creep,' i.e., bidders who are consistently chosen over other suppliers may attempt to appropriate a greater share of relational rents over time.
Examining the second paradox: do buyer choices concentrate relational capital or reduce future asymmetries in relational capital among bidders?(H3)
17 Given truncation of the dependent variable (at zero) a tobit specification would be preferable. However, the random effects assumptions are violated, and Honore's (1993) method of estimating fixed-effects models with censored data will not produce consistent estimates given the length of the (unbalanced) panel. 18 Winning bidders that have no relational capital are bidders whose winning contracts have not started by the time of the subsequent competitive bid event.
The prior analysis, suggests that suppliers do attempt to capture a significant (and growing) share of relational rents. Under these conditions we predict the buyer will strategically assemble a portfolio of relationships that distributes relational capital more evenly across suppliers (H3).
We test H3 by comparing the exchange history gap at CBE with the forecast exchange history gap following CBE, which examines whether the buyer's choice of supplier raised the asymmetry of the top two suppliers or reduced it. following CBE and exchange history entropy at CBE with exchange history entropy following CBE. In both cases the null hypothesis of equal means is rejected at p < .0001.
Buyer strategy: manipulating supplier inferences about the value of relational capital (H4)
We next turn to examining our final hypothesis, H4, which predicts that Buyco will seek to make it difficult for bidders to infer the value of relational rents by strategically ignoring these rents periodically. Ignoring relationship history from time to time could also enable Buyco to generate a reputation for 'toughness' in negotiation.
To investigate H4, we examine whether Buyco places a stable weight on relational capital over our period of study. Following Elfenbein and Zenger (2014) , we estimate a discrete choice conditional logit model (McFadden 1973) with the dependent variable y ij , which takes on the value 1 if supplier j wins the contract for item bundle i and 0 otherwise. Let the variables p ij and h jm be defined as above, and let z ijm be a vector of the remaining control variables describing the bidder and its bid strategy in the CBE. The utility Buyco obtains for selecting bidder j for item i in CBE m can be represented as: (7) where  ijm is drawn from an extreme value distribution, and represents factors that are unobservable to the econometrician and are independent of the coefficients and the independent variables. We cluster standard errors on m to allow for potential non-independence within a CBE. Let ( ). The probability, then, that supplier i is awarded the contract is:
We estimate equation (8) via maximum likelihood and focus on coefficient  2 , which represents the importance of exchange history. To examine whether the importance of exchange history remains constant over time, we split the sample into six distinct quarters and estimate the coefficients on  2 separately in each quarter. While we recognize that our division of periods is arbitrary, we note that it is sufficient to uncover differences in the importance placed on partner exchange history over time if they exist. We make no claims that this represents the true frequency with which Buyco should modify the signals it sends to suppliers about the value of relational capital.
19 Table 6 reports the results of these estimates. Columns 1 reports the baseline specification, and column 2 includes interactions between h jm and X m as in equation (8), these interactions essentially serve as controls for the mix of items being auctioned in the CBE, for which the importance of relational capital may vary. In column 3, we report results of the model that estimates individual coefficients for each of the six quarters under study. This specification indicates that Buyco places a large weight on h j during three of the six quarters and a small weight, not significantly different from zero, on h j in the other three quarters. Moreover, the pattern of weight placed on h j quarter by quarter tends to oscillate. A test of joint equality rejects the null hypothesis at p < .05. Column 4 includes interaction terms between h jm and X m. When these controls for differences in the mix of items being auctioned are included, the pattern remains, but becomes less pronounced. The test of joint equality rejects the null at p < .1. We interpret these results as providing support for H4.
DISCUSSION
Our results suggest that our buyer and its array of potential and current suppliers recognize value in relationships and actively seek to appropriate this value. The analysis of suppliers' bidding behavior generates results that are largely consistent with our hypotheses. Sellers increase the prices they propose as the level of relational capital with the buyer increases. Moreover, sellers more actively seek to appropriate returns to relational capital when they recognize rival bidders have weaker relationships, consistent with theories of added value. Furthermore, the bids of sellers with relational capital are highly dependent on results of the bid events immediately prior, consistent with the idea that these bidders may be uncertain about the value of their relational capital and Buyco's willingness-to-pay for it. Other interpretations of this result, however, are possible.
20
The analysis of buyer behavior also yields results that are consistent with our hypotheses. The results highlight a forward-looking buyer that evaluates both the benefits of relationships with incumbents and initiates the formation of relational capital with new suppliers in order to restrict sellers' pricing leverage. In addition our data suggest that a buyer may actively seek to keep the seller uncertain as to the value the buyer assigns to relational capital. Such uncertainty may cause the seller to constrain its efforts to appropriate more of the returns from relational capital. These results all point to a buyer who confronts a second paradox in crafting exchange relationships-one that is quite distinct from that articulated in prior literature (Uzzi 1997; Lazzarini, Miller, and Zenger 2008) . Here relationships are distributed not due to uncertainty about capability or technology, as this issue is dealt with through prequalification processes, but rather stems from an effort to both create and capture value.
20 Sellers' capacity constraints, for example, might explain a similar pattern.
Our theory suggests, and our empirical evidence corroborates, the existence of a second paradox of embeddedness that occurs even in the complete absence of any relationship "dark side" (Anderson and Jap 2005, Day et al.2013) . Thus, even if alternative mechanisms can be found to limit the problems of over-embeddedness previously discussed in the literature, a forward looking buyer may well limit the development of some relationships to improve long-run value appropriation, preferring a larger share of a smaller pie.
Limitations
Our study is subject to several limitations. First, although we examine the behavior of many sellers, we study the behavior of a single buyer. Replication across dozens of buyers would be ideal.
Second, although we can observe bidders' attempts to appropriate value directly by examining their bids, we can only infer indirectly the parameters that affect Buyco's decisions. Moreover, the supplier decisions made by Buyco represent the outcome of a complex (and sometimes varying) organizational process that involves multiple procurement professionals, engineers, prequalification teams, and business unit or factory managers. The importance of exchange history may vary substantially across these actors, in no small part because they face differing incentives. Our inferences from Buyco's choices thus represent averages, not only across different product categories, but over different decision-makers as well. Finally, it is possible that an omitted variable explains the formation of the prior relationship, the value of the relationship to Buyco, and attempts by bidders to appropriate value. The extensive prequalification of bidders and the commodity nature of the products involved, however, restrict the degree to which differences in production capacity and capability to produce the physical product can be driving the results.
Further qualitative evidence
To further examine our theory, we presented our theory and findings to a team of Buyco corporate procurement specialists, who were largely unaware of the nature or content of our study. Over a two-and-half hour session, we asked for their evaluation and assessment. Our results and conclusions were generally corroborated. On the value of relationships, the group acknowledged that "we do value relationships, but that's not good enough," and that "in some countries … relationships are more important than others." Interestingly we learned that efforts were made following the period of our study to directly quantify the value of relationships in order to, "take the emotion out [of the decision]."
Procurement specialists and factory managers were asked to translate the value of relationships into differences in lead time, engineering time, and risk for prospective suppliers.
With respect to bidders' attempts to capture value from relationships, they stated that "incumbent" suppliers would "take advantage of the relationship" by "not bidding aggressively" and that "quite often [we need to] send a clear message to the incumbent." Awards were granted "strategically"
and "with future considerations in mind." However, their comments also suggest that these future considerations were often evaluated at a higher level than our theoretical discussion implies. Rather than focusing on tradeoffs between deepening relationships and creating bargaining leverage through new relationships for each bundle of items, we learned that it was typical for top management to issue broad directives to the procurement teams to "expand the supply base" and alternatively to "support our
[existing] suppliers." 21 This type of movement back and forth between objectives is broadly consistent with our H4. It may be that mixing these objectives over time may be the most practical way to balance the appropriation and creation of value through relational capital over time.
A further piece of evidence lends some support for this view. Although Buyco's corporate procurement team did not keep data about premiums that they paid over the lowest bid for each auction, they provided us with a key performance indicators database which recorded the name of the lowest bidder by price and the awardee by auction. We used this data to construct Figure 2 , which shows the 21 In practice, it may be quite difficult to generate an appropriate incentive mechanism that prompts a buying agent to effectively weigh future bargaining considerations in making present choices. In particular, problems of turnover, performance measurement, and private incentives may preclude the effectiveness of any such incentives. Top-down, hierarchically imposed mandates regarding procurement choices may provide an alternative mechanism that encourages strong, but not unique relationships or relationships that balance value creation and value appropriation. These top-down mandates may take the form of "choose a new supplier" or "choose the lowest bidder." If improvements in future bargaining scenarios are uncertain, are difficult to measure, or are only revealed over time, then balancing value creation and value appropriation may require the organization to oscillate between "maximize present value of the supply contracts and "minimize price, while expanding the supply base." A similar situation is explored in the context of governance choices in Nickerson and Zenger (2002) . were intended to exploit uncertainty, to balance the creation and capture of relational rents, or both.
CONCLUSION
Buyers and suppliers seek to both create relational assets and to appropriate the rents that flow from them. The buyer-supplier networks that we observe are a complex outcome of buyer and supplier efforts to create and capture value in relationships. Maintaining continuity with a particular supplier may increase the maximum value co-created by both parties. At the same time, developing relationships with new suppliers can improve the minimum value the buyer is guaranteed to appropriate. From the buyer's perspective, where the balance lies between these two alternatives depends on suppliers' behavior in appropriating their added value. More aggressive value appropriation behavior on the part of suppliers, along with 'value capture creep' may limit the degree to which stable, ongoing relationships are desirable, and it may encourage players to develop multiple, but shallower, relationships in order to improve the value that they are able to appropriate.
Thus, in addition to the "paradox of embeddedness" described by Uzzi (1997) , the issue of value appropriation, too, may limit the degree to which embedded supply relationships are desirable. Our contribution is to highlight these issues theoretically, and to show that, at least in one context, we observe dynamics consistent with firms' jockeying over the benefits of relational capital. 
Note: if h <  and the new supplier is chosen, then in period 2 the incumbent's added value 0, the new supplier's added value is V() -V(h), the minimum the buyer can appropriate will be v + V(h), and the maximum will be v + V(). The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the bidder's bid, in USD. The model incorporates market basket-level fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered on bid event, in parenthesis; ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-sided test). Asset specificity remains statistically significant when other interaction terms are dropped.
APPENDIX 2. Characteristics of Parts Procured via Reverse Auctions
To measure attributes of the exchange settings for items in a CBE, we administered a questionnaire to procurement experts at Buyco. We pre-tested our questionnaire with a cross-functional team at Buyco including both engineers and procurement experts to ensure that our questions were well understood. We then obtained ratings from two procurement experts at Buyco. From our interviews with Buyco's procurement staff, we concluded that because common parts were clustered within a CBE, the heterogeneity in procured products was largely at the level of the CBE. 22 For each CBE, the expert raters were supplied with detailed descriptions and drawings of the bundle of products within the CBE. Each expert then scored the products in each CBE along a dozen dimensions using a 7-point Likert scale. Using these survey data, we obtained five measures of exchange attributes: asset specificity of production equipment, the rate of technological change, predictability in demand over time, the number of capable worldwide suppliers, and complexity of the parts procured. Table A1 provides data on the survey items used in measuring each construct. Our experts' ratings were well correlated, yielding average reliability of between .66 and .90. To facilitate the analysis and interpretation of results below, we utilize as measures the z-scored average of the two experts' ratings. To provide these parts, the awarded supplier will need (or has already made, if the incumbent supplier) to make substantial investments in tooling and equipment that are specific to Buyco.
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.75
Number of Worldwide Suppliers
There are numerous suppliers in the world with the capability to supply these parts 8 .66
Demand Variation There can be a high level of variance month-to-month or season-to-season from the forecast demand for these parts 7 .67
Technological Change
The underlying technology required to manufacture these products has changed rapidly over the past five years 6 .77
Complexity ( = .88) 1: These represent complex parts that are difficult to manufacture 2: There is extensive, specialized skill, knowledge, and experience required to generate these parts 3: Very small variations from production specs render these parts completely unusable 7 7
7
.90 *Answers were on a seven point Likert scale, so the maximum summed response is 14.
